Therefore,
this generic concept of plan does not depend upon its pertinence to a given
economic and social system, but upon the use of techno-political reason in the
decision-making process. There always
is, though, the risk of confusing this process with a calculation determined by
precise scientific laws, based upon an objective diagnosis of reality.
In
real life, plan is surrounded by uncertainty, inaccuracy, surprise, rejection and
support by other players. Consequently,
its calculation is hazy and based upon the understanding of the situation, that
is, reality analyzed from the particular perspective of those who plan. Eventually this plan leads to action, so
that, in order to quote John Friedman: one can say that plan is mediation
between knowledge and reason. Such mediation, however, does not occur through
a simple relation between reality and sciences, for the knowledge of the
former goes beyond the tradition scope of the latter.
Man,
faced with a situation, struggles between the two extremes. On one of them he or she totally controls the
outcomes of his or her practice. On the other one, he or she challenges or
submits to processes in which the player is carried away by circumstances beyond his or her
control. In the first case the player decides on, acts and knows
beforehand the achievable goals; in the second case, the player decides on nothing, he or she
can but bet on the future
and accept fate. The player is a
beholder of the world that determines his
or her course of action, a world the player cannot change, but only judge and criticize this reality, or
thank for and regret his or her fate.
Even
in the border zone of the later case, though, history shows us leaders who
challenge the impossible, under the most adverse conditions. In this theoretical extreme, plan is submitted
to the maximum proof of its effectiveness.
If it cannot be powerful in adversity and yields to improvisation, with
much more grounds the latter will displace the former under favorable
conditions.
Real
rulers, as conductors of situations remain between the two extremes. The balance among the variables they control
and the ones they fail to control defines their governability on the object of
plan.
The
governability of man over reality indicates precisely towards which of the theoretical
extremes the situation tends. The ruler
may decide as to the variables he or she controls, but is often unable to
ensure outcomes, for they depend upon a part of the world out of the ruler’s control.
This
difficulty does not discourage man’s intent to rule reality through bets that,
with some basis of calculation, lead man to announce the outcomes of his
action. Politics require commitments
that are expressed as announcements of outcomes.
A
plan is a commitment that announces outcomes, although such outcomes do not
fully or mainly depend upon the fulfillment of those commitments.
The
bases for the bets of a ruler are all the more solid the greater is the weight
of the variables such ruler controls vis-à-vis those he does not control, and
all the more feeble if the variables controlled by the ruler are few and of lesser
weight. In another extreme of absolute
control, the bet becomes certainty as to the outcomes. In yet another one, of absolute lack of
control, the bet is a matter of good or bad luck.
The
process of government dwells in an intermediary zone between absolute certainty
and sheer luck. Consequently, the theory of government is not one of
deterministic control by the ruler over a system, nor the theory of a mere gamble,
but it contains doses of both elements.
